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BOOK REVIEWS
“THE QUESTION IS . . . WHICH IS TO BE MASTER—THAT’S ALL.”
The War for the Seas: A Maritime History of World War II, by Evan Mawdsley. New Haven, CT:  
Yale Univ. Press, 2019. 600 pages. $32.50.
It is a daunting task to attempt to write 
a single-volume history of World War 
II at sea from 1939 to 1945, covering all 
the participants in all the theaters of that 
global conflict. I am intimately aware of 
the many pitfalls that await the historian 
who has the hubris to try, since I too 
wrote a book on this topic, published two 
years ago (World War II at Sea, Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2018). I therefore applaud 
Evan Mawdsley of Glasgow University 
for taking up the challenge. It is a bit 
delicate for a reviewer to evaluate a book 
so similar to one that he himself has 
written, but since the works complement 
one another, I think it can be done fairly.
Interestingly, both books divide the war 
into five parts of about five chapters 
each. The fact that the authors did 
this independently suggests that the 
war in fact can be differentiated into 
identifiable phases: the European war, 
Britain alone, the global war at sea, the 
growing Allied domination, and the 
final victory. Each of us also covered 
the Battle of the Atlantic, or the war on 
trade, in three chapters embedded in 
separate parts of the narrative; this too 
suggests that we are on to something.
The first decision the writer of any 
complex subject has to make is whether 
to approach it chronologically or topi-
cally. World War II was, after all, a huge, 
sprawling conflict, so telling its maritime 
story in sequence means bouncing 
around from theater to theater all over 
the globe. Mawdsley instead chooses the 
topical approach, offering separate chap-
ters on naval aviation, intelligence, and 
amphibious warfare, for example. This 
allows him to develop themes and follow 
through with the consequences of one or 
another technology or decision. On the 
other hand, that approach compels him to 
insert periodic notes into the text indicat-
ing that issues raised while developing 
particular themes were “discussed previ-
ously,” “have already been described,” or 
are forthcoming, “as will be seen.” These 
create a kind of narrative speed bump, 
especially for those not grounded in the 
chronological structure of the war.
Another decision concerns coverage. 
Including every convoy, skirmish, and 
naval confrontation in the war would 
transform the book into a compendium 
or an encyclopedia rather than a history. 
And, of course, including more of the 
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smaller actions necessarily means devot-
ing less space to the critically important 
ones. Coverage is always a delicate matter, 
for while leaving something out invites 
criticism that the book is incomplete, 
limiting coverage of the critical turning 
points invites criticism of another kind.
Mawdsley has chosen to be inclusive, 
and he covers a number of events that 
are overlooked in most general histories 
(including my own), such as the British 
raid on the Lofoten Islands off Norway 
(Operation CLAYMORE) in 1941 and 
the invasion of Madagascar (Operation 
IRONCLAD) in 1942, as well as extensive 
coverage of the Soviet navy in both the 
Baltic and Black Seas. All that comes 
with a cost, of course; running to six 
hundred pages, Mawdsley’s book is 
not short, and yet it occasionally feels 
crowded as events pile up on one 
another—although no doubt that is how 
the war felt to those who fought it as well.
Mawdsley is not afraid to make judg-
ments. He argues, for example, that the 
role of “special intelligence” (ULTRA) 
has been greatly exaggerated and 
that Hitler gave up on the invasion of 
England (Operation SEA LION) before the 
Battle of Britain even began. He defends 
Churchill’s decision to attack the French 
fleet at Mers el-Kébir, asserting that it 
was “correct” (p. 71), and concedes that 
the Dieppe raid was “badly planned,” 
for which Mountbatten “deserves 
some blame” (p. 282). In the Pacific, 
Mawdsley concludes that Kimmel and 
Short were “rightly held responsible” 
for being unready on 7 December 
1941 (p. 182) and that Nagumo was 
“surely right” not to approve a third aerial 
attack against Pearl Harbor (p. 181).
It would be inappropriate for me to 
recommend one of these books over 
the other. Therefore I merely will 
suggest here that those interested 
in the naval war from 1939 to 1945 
should read (and buy) both of them.
CRAIG L. SYMONDS
Leading Change in Military Organizations: Primer 
for Senior Leaders, by Thomas P. Galvin. Carlisle, 
PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018. 120 
pages. Available for download at publications 
.armywarcollege.edu/. Free.
As Charles D. Allen states in the fore-
word, “70 to 80 percent of organizational 
change efforts fail” (p. vii). Numerous 
reasons exist why initiatives to improve 
an organization’s performance, effective-
ness, or morale do not succeed: incorrect 
problem diagnosis, poor planning or 
resourcing, strategy mismatch to culture, 
and resistance, among others. U.S. 
Army War College professor Thomas 
P. Galvin’s well-researched primer 
effectively distills numerous organiza-
tional change philosophies and strategies 
into a practical and intuitive guidebook 
for military professionals at all levels.
A plethora of books on organizational 
change exists, with an Amazon.com 
search returning hundreds of results. 
Professor Galvin tailors his approach to 
the unique challenges of the military, 
which prepares for an uncertain future 
environment that before the crucible 
of operations and combat can only be 
simulated. He argues that most change 
efforts are too process oriented, at the 
expense of the often-overlooked context 
of the environment and the content 
of the change effort, which explain 
its purpose and the path to success. 
To this end, he develops a framework 
similar to the military’s planning process 
that emphasizes context and content, 
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